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Abstract 
 
This study examines whether the level of institutional ownership is correlated with managerial 
discretionary accounting choices in the UK. Prior studies examined the institutional ownership as 
a stand-alone factor for earnings management. This study examines how the managerial 
acrobatics over the reported results vary according to the different levels of institutional 
ownership. 
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the association of institutional ownership and 
earnings management, not only from discretionary accruals perspective but as well from real 
activities perspective. It is crucial to understand the underlying factors that enhance or 
undermine the transparency of reported earnings and more specifically how the ownership 
structure exerts positive or negative influence on the credibility of financial results. Analysts, 
investors, auditors, public policers and managers should be interested in this kind of analysis 
because it provides insight how the level of institutional ownership can be a determinant factor of 
earnings quality in the UK. 
Our findings suggest that the different levels of institutional investors’ participation correspond to 
different levels of earnings management exerting a quadratic influence. 
 
Keywords: institutional ownership, earnings management, real activities manipulation, income – 
increasing discretionary accruals 
 
 
 
 
Tsivgouli Sofia 
  
29/11/2017 
  
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[4] 
 
Preface  
 
I would like to thank Dr Stergios Leventis and Dr Alexandros Sikalidis for their valuable guidance 
throughout my dissertation. Their advice and assistance contributed to the throughput of this 
dissertation. I am as well grateful to my family and friends for their continuous support and 
patience that galvanized me to complete this study. 
 
 
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[5] 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3 
Preface ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................... 6 
2. Literature review .................................................................................................................................................. 7 
2.1 Short – term oriented institutional investors and earnings management .................................................... 9 
2.2 Long– term oriented institutional investors and earnings management .................................................... 10 
2.3 Testable hypothesis in the UK investor landscape ....................................................................................... 12 
2.3.1 UK ownership environment ........................................................................................................................... 14 
2.3.2. Testable hypothesis ...................................................................................................................................... 20 
3. Research design ................................................................................................................................................ 21 
3. 1 Data and Sample Selection ............................................................................................................................. 21 
3.2 Measuring Institutional Ownership .................................................................................................................. 21 
3.3 Measuring Earnings Management .................................................................................................................. 22 
3.3.1 Measuring Discretionary Accruals ............................................................................................................... 22 
3.3.2 Measuring real activities manipulation ........................................................................................................ 24 
3.4 Empirical models ................................................................................................................................................ 25 
3.5 Control Variables ............................................................................................................................................... 27 
4. Results .................................................................................................................................................................. 29 
4.1 Regression analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 32 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis ............................................................................................................................................ 40 
5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................ 41 
References ............................................................................................................................................................... 43 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................................ 52 
 
 
  
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[6] 
 
Introduction 
 
Institutional ownership is the determinant factor in the UK investor landscape (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2007), with prominent influence over the corporate performance. Their presence and 
involvement in the corporate governance are highlighted in the Stewardship Code. The Code 
provides a clear understanding of institutional owners’ responsibilities and their fundamental role 
in the growth momentum of UK listed companies. Institutional shareholders1 are expected to be 
active through their voting and other rights and exert control over the managing directors. Their 
role is to safeguard that boards act in the shareholders’ best interest and they are willing to 
serve as informed and engaged owners. Enhanced accountability of institutional shareholders 
acts as trust injections in the UK and wider financial system.  
 Within this investor setting, this study examines how the presence of institutional owners 
impacts on managerial discretionary accounting choices. In order to obtain a more holistic view, 
there will be an examination of the divergent views regarding the stewardship role of institutional 
shareholders and if their role is a driving force for lesser/greater earnings management. 
Prior studies suggest that there is evidence both for a positive and a negative association. In this 
study, I examine whether companies with a high or low presence of institutional ownership 
display a negative or positive correlation with earnings management and how this association is 
actually incarnated in abnormal accruals and real activities manipulation. The institutional 
ownership and their association with earnings management actually challenge the linear 
relationship of previous studies. Koh (2003) find that the levels of institutional ownership and 
earnings management are associated following a concave (inverted – U) relation. 
 Two different proxies are used for earnings management: 1) discretionary accruals and 2) real 
activities manipulation, so as to monitor the association of the institutional ownership with the 
earnings management.  
In the next section, there will be a discussion on the related literature. Section 3 describes the 
research design and Section 4 reports the results and the corresponding findings. Section 5 
presents the conclusions of the study.  
 
                                                          
1
 In the Code the term “institutional investor” includes institutional shareholders such as pension funds, 
insurance companies, and investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles and any agents 
appointed to act on their behalf. 
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2. Literature review 
 
There is evidence that accounting irregularities are stemming from controversial managerial 
behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). There is a breadth of evidence that managers perform 
accounting acrobatics in order to alter reported earnings. Healy and Wahlen (1999) stipulate that 
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen 1999, pp 368) 
There is a wealth of motives that incentivize an over-emphasis on short-term accounting returns 
and discourage long-term investment.  Managers have motives to manipulate earnings in part so 
as to increase their revenue streams, a common phenomenon especially when their 
remuneration is interwoven with the share price (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Conyon, 
2006).  Sweeney (1994) provides evidence that managers of firms close to default are more 
inclined to use income – increasing changes. In addition, Beneish (2001) has identified that 
possible motives for earnings manipulation are debt contracts; compensation agreements; 
equity offerings; insider trading. Furthermore, the constant pressure to meet the pre-defined 
earnings benchmarks due to analysts’ forecasts pressure (Bartov et al., 2002; Graham et al., 
2005) or the fear of dismissal indulge managers to employ accounting malpractice (Peasnell et 
al, 2005; Graham et al., 2005). Dechow et al. (2000) show that managers are reluctant to report 
early the bad news. Thus, the possibility to employ upward earnings management and avoid 
reporting losses becomes increasing (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Roychowdhurry, 2006; 
Graham et al., 2005). The managerial discretion eventually hurts the credibility of the financial 
results, which is translated into a type of agency cost (Davidson et al., 2005; Wang, 2014). 
Earnings management is commonly realized through accruals manipulation (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Dechow et al., 1995) and real activities manipulation (Roychowdhurry, 2006; 
Kim et al., 2011). Accruals provide a springboard for manipulation since the financial reports do 
not depict always the components of discretionary accruals and the changes in firm’s value 
which are included in the earnings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). There are accruals 
components, such as R & D expenses treatment, early sales recognition, depreciation, which 
create a vast “terrain” for managers to exert discretionary accounting practices (Bergstresser 
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and Philippon, 2006). Roychowdhurry (2006) adds to the endless list the delayed write – offs 
and under – provisioning for bad debts that lead to abnormal accruals. Roychowdhurry (2006) 
outlines how earnings management is realized through real activities manipulation as well. There 
is evidence that real activities manipulation is led by discounted prices and decreased 
discretionary expenses to improve the reported earnings (Roychowdhurry, 2006). Operational 
activities, such as over – production to decrease the production costs, provide loopholes for 
manipulation due to the difficulty of the auditors to track down the corresponding irregularities 
(Roychowdhurry, 2006). 
 
There are several studies which investigate the possible association of earnings management 
and institutional ownership. There is evidence that firms with institutional ownership affect the 
earnings quality (Charitou et al., 2007). There are two contradictory views regarding the above-
described association. One school of thought, Bushee (2001) and Porter (1992) view large 
blockholders as myopic and passive investors focused on short – term benefits. According to 
Coffee (2010), the passivity of institutional investors has been long-standing. The promotion of 
trading and short-term returns lead institutional shareholders to flawed decisions, deviating from 
the long -term success of the corporate business model or being even destructive (Bushee, 
2001). The asset managers exert great pressure on managers to focus on short – term goals 
(Jacobs, 2011; Bolton et al., 2012). 
Contrary to the above view, there is evidence that institutional ownership leads to less income – 
increasing or income – decreasing practices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), which lead to 
enhanced earnings quality and credibility of reported earnings (Dechow et al., 1995). Empirical 
studies have supported that large blockholders are incentivized to actively engage in the 
monitoring of the management (Stiglitz, 1985). Roychowdhurry (2006) suggests that the 
presence of sophisticated investors contributes to the earnings management containment. Mitra 
and Cready (2005) find evidence that active institutional stewardship may constrain the 
managerial flexibility to employ accounting malpractice in part. 
Furthermore, there has been also evidence that the actual association of earnings management 
and institutional ownership should be investigated under the lens of their investment orientation. 
Long–term focused investors are associated negatively with upwards or downwards earnings 
management (Koh, 2003). Consequently, the association is non-linear, alleging that a higher 
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participation of institutional investors acts as a mechanism of mitigation of earnings management 
and an effective corporate governance mechanism (Koh, 2003).  
It is worthwhile to mention that Wang (2014) provides credence that institutional investors with a 
long investment horizon have a trivial impact on earnings management, which imposes that the 
long-term orientation as stand-alone is not the touchstone for the mitigation of the earnings 
management. 
 
2.1 Short – term oriented institutional investors and earnings management  
 
The institutional investor sentiment and attitude vary, based on the objectives for near – term or 
long – term earnings.  As mentioned in the Final Report of Hampel Committee in 1991, typically 
institutions are disengaged in corporate governance. They usually neglect their voting rights and 
employ mechanisms such as short – selling and exit options, instead of giving support to their 
investments over the long haul. 
In the institutional passivity realm, the institutional investors remain passive when it comes to 
coalition actions, because investors are difficultly induced in shouldering agency costs (Black 
and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 2010; Bratton and Cahery, 2015), but as well there are rivalries 
among them (Black and Coffee, 1994). The fear of losing liquidity or containing their portfolio 
diversification thwarts institutional investors from being actually involved (Black and Coffee, 
1994; Coffee, 2010; Tilba et al., 2013). Besides, most institutional funds (i.e. mutual funds) exert 
their rights by employing money managers and outside advisors, unwilling to delve into 
corporate governance issues (Coffee, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012; Bratton and Cahery, 2015).  
Furthermore, there is evidence that using accruals accounting to inflate the reported earnings 
and meet analysts’ forecasts is rewarded by institutional investors (Bartov et al., 2002; Graham 
et al., 2012). There is an established premium for meeting analysts’ expectations, even if it 
derives from earnings management (Bartov et al., 2002). This short – termism has been 
historically destructive, as the major crashes and bubbles have proven (Bolton et al., 2012). 
Focus on the stock price and short – term price movements as the main corporate performance 
criterion contributes to careless business decisions that benefit only “hit and go” investors. 
Besides, all the shareholders reap the benefits of the activism, even If they had not shouldered 
the costs of it. This leads to further disengagement (Becht et al., 2008). 
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Adding to the above list, it has been argued that institutional investors exert undue pressure on 
asset managers to achieve short-term earnings (Jacobs, 2011; Bolton et al., 2012). The 
incentivization of asset managers is justifiable, since their compensation is benchmarked against 
market indexes (Bolton et al., 2012). Black (1991) justifies that money managers have 
monitoring and incentive problems due to the fact that they gain a small portion of the corporate 
gains. Bushee (2001) and Burns et al. (2006) allege shortsighted investors prod managers to 
falsification of financial results. Jiang and Anandarajan (2009) argue that transient investors urge 
management to boost artificially the reported earnings. According to the McKinsey Quarterly 
survey panel of more than 1,000 C-suite executives and board members in late 2015 and early 
2016 in USA, they found corroboratory evidence that managers were pressured to implement 
managerial discretion. Koh (2003) argues that the short investment horizon leads to earnings 
management paths. 
The above suggests the disengagement of institutional investors from the effective monitoring 
and the favouritism of short-termism.  
 
2.2 Long– term oriented institutional investors and earnings management  
 
Institutional investors can contribute to the corporate value realization (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). Large institutional investors have the resources to monitor and constrain managerial 
behaviour. The arsenal of institutional investors in case of controversy with management 
includes:  “exit”, “voice” and “loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970). “Voice” is the expression of 
dissatisfaction with the management and it is actually an act of engagement.  Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) affirm that the institutional investors’ interests are in conjunction with the containment of 
managerial absurd behaviour.  
Maug (1998) identifies that liquid stock market induces institutional investors to actively 
participate in the monitoring because it reduces the monitoring costs through informed trading. 
Market applauds and reacts positively towards to the investor activism (Brav et al, 2008). 
Chung et al. (2002) find evidence that the presence of institutional shareholders impedes 
managers from managing earnings towards their targets. As mentioned in Goranova & Ryan 
(2014), managers are more intent to complying with the investment structures proposed by 
institutional investors or coordinated groups, rather than individual shareholders. Jiambalvo et al. 
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(2002) argue that the presence of institutional investors is positively associated with the salience 
of stock prices to depict current – period information and their predictability force to depict future 
– period information. 
Black and Coffee (1994) have purported that an institutional closed – doors oversight takes 
place, far away from public feuds. Institutional owners seem to be on the sidelines, but there is 
an active presence behind the scenes (Ball, 1990; Black and Coffee, 1994; McCahery et al., 
2016). Prior studies (Williams and Conley, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2006) suggest that institutional 
investors in the UK engage with the management (meetings with the boards and top managers) 
to stipulate the corporate strategy. Levit (2014) claims that institutional activism through 
communication and the behind the scenes construction of the relationship with the managers 
can be more effective as a corporate governance mechanism. 
Graham et al. (2005) assert that farsighted investors, with long-term investment horizons, are 
actively engaged in the success of their investment portfolios. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(1997) find evidence that owners with a substantial holding in a company affect positively the 
containment of earnings management, through their shareholder activism. Their active 
engagement is a deterrent factor for practices that lead to abnormal returns (Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 1997). The mitigation of information asymmetries constrains income – inflating 
managerial choices (Rajgopal et Venkatachalam, 1997). 
A key consideration is that institutional investors should be viewed as an amalgam of different 
groups with different embedded investing culture (Black, 1991; Black and Coffee, 1994; Del 
Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Koh, 2003; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Wang, 2014). Hsu and Koh 
(2005), who examine both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management, 
find that short-term and long-term institutional investors co-exist and exert different promptings 
on earnings manipulation. Cheng and Reitenga (2009) suggest that the institutional profile is a 
leading factor to examine the association between institutional investors and earnings 
management. The divergence on the investing profile and the investment horizon between 
mutual funds, pension funds and insurance funds is a catalyst. Black and Coffee (1994) list 
insurers as more long-term investors than pension funds. Pension funds are considered to keep 
a distance from the active involvement in corporate governance, while mutual funds are chiefly 
passive (Black & Coffee, 1994). Goranova & Ryan (2014) argue that public pension funds are 
forced into constrained engagement due to political goalposts exerted by their managers. 
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[12] 
 
Contrary to the above view, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) argue that pension – funds 
strategies are oriented toward to the value creation for the firm. The recent rise of hedge funds 
imbued firms with the activist monitoring through their influence on corporate boards and 
management (Brav et al., 2008). Hedge funds presence act as a bellwether for active 
engagement and market reacts accordingly with upwards stock prices (Brav et al., 2008). The 
role of hedge funds though persists to be questionable due to their tactics. 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1997), Koh (2003) display corroboratory evidence that the 
leading standpoint to criticize the role of institutional investors is the level of their participation. 
Cheng and Reitenga (2009) assert that activist investors can mitigate the effect of earnings 
pressure. Koh (2003) argues that long-term investors can be the countervailing power to 
managerial discretion. Burns et al. (2006) report that “dedicated” investors act as a credible 
mechanism of discretionary accruals decrease. As mentioned in Burns et al. (2006), it is crucial 
to understand that one of the most significant determinants of corporate value creation is the 
investment horizon of institutional investors. 
 
2.3 Testable hypothesis in the UK investor landscape 
 
The UK is a dynamic capital market, with a strong legislative framework, strong investor rights 
and low ownership concentration (Faccio et al., 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Armour et al., 2009). 
According to the Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017, the UK ranks as the seventh more 
competitive country among the 138 countries under the scope, with a score of 5.492 (Schwab, 
2016). It effectively protects outside investors meaning that the legislative framework reduces 
insiders’ need to exert earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). According to the Global 
Competitiveness Index, the UK ranks eighth for the protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
with a score of 5.42 and demonstrates a 7.83 score of investor protection (Schwab, 2016). 
According to Investment Association, the size of the asset management industry was 373% of 
the UK’s GDP in 2016 asserting that the asset managers in the UK play an influential role as 
institutional investors. 
                                                          
2
  Scale ranges from 1 to 7. 
3
 Scale ranges from 1 to 10. 
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Black and Coffee (1994) assert that the dynamics of the UK market and the judiciary facilitate 
the shareholder engagement compared to the United States. There is evidence that civil 
enforcement against directors of public companies in the UK is nearly non – existent (Armour et 
al., 2009). The above phenomenon is attributable to the potent shareholder governance rights, 
which serve as a substitute for private enforcement (Armour et al., 2009). The U.K. regulatory 
regime places great emphasis on proactive screening, so as to discourage directors to breach 
their duties (Armour et al., 2009).  
Delving into the legislative framework, the London Stock Exchange has specific Listing Rules 
that force the obligation of public companies to comply with the Combined Code (Wang, 2014).  
Besides, the publishing of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010 evolved to be a powerful tool that 
exhorts institutional investors’ engagement to effective monitoring. The Stewardship Code 
(2010) engages institutional investors to the firm’s monitoring and encourages them all to report 
about their adherence to the Code. This adherence to the Code is in alignment with investors’ 
interest in the long-term viability of the firm. 
During 2016, the Investment Association4 launched a Productivity Action Plan emphasizing the 
productivity as an enabler of UK economy through far – sighted investing and effective 
stewardship (The Investment Association, 2017). Among the initiatives of the Plan was the 
disengagement from short-termism, by halting the issuance of short – term earnings guidance 
and quarterly reporting, while introducing the Long Term Reporting Guidance (the “Guidance”). 
The Guidance mandates the distinct articulation of capital allocation decisions and its alignment 
to the success of the corporate sustainability. The Association completed the issuance of a 
Stewardship Reporting Framework to assist members to their role fulfilment as effective 
monitors. One of the initiatives to be completed is the implementation of specific methodologies 
so as to calculate the average holding periods and align the investment horizons with long-term 
value creation.  
All the above suggest that in  the UK apply all the conditions that incentivize institutional owners 
to be involved; exert active stewardship and keep constrained the managerial discretion. 
Effective stewardship results in more transparent and enhanced quality reported earnings (UK 
Stewardship Code, 2010). 
                                                          
4
 The Investment Association is the trade body that represents UK investment managers. 
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Notwithstanding, the UK investor environment is an amalgam of short-term and long-term 
investors. The Final Report on Corporate Governance of the Hampel Committee argues that UK 
institutional owners are a heterogeneous group with different investment objectives.  Unbundling 
the investor profile of institutional investors will provide insight about their objectives and their 
investment horizons (Wang, 2014). 
 
2.3.1 UK ownership environment 
 
The rise of institutional investors during the past decades (from the 1960s to 1990s) has 
entrenched their dominance in the UK investment landscape. Since the 1960s, controlling 
blockholders were incentivized to dilute their shares, combined with a vast dissemination of 
shares from private into public hands (Franks et al., 2004; Coffee, 2010). The primordial role of 
institutions - pension funds, insurance companies, unit and investment trusts – is emphasized in 
the Final Report on Corporate Governance of the Hampel Committee, dated back in 1991. Black 
and Coffee (1994) allege that two-thirds of the UK listed companies are dominated by 
institutions and point out that the lesser legal barriers merit the institutional involvement in 
corporate governance. Monks (2005) points out that 10% of shareholder have the legislative 
power to oust any or even all the directors of any company at any time. 
As a consequence of the market turbulence during 2007 – 2009 and the struggle of the 
economy to claw its way back to viability, the shareholder passivity in the UK declined after 2007 
(Wang, 2014). The financial turmoil in the UK gave new birth to the stewardship role of 
institutional investors (Tilba et al., 2013). The UK Corporate Governance Code (introduced in 
2010 and renamed in Combined Code) dwells on the importance of the dialogue with 
shareholders based on the mutual understanding of shareholders’ objectives. The current 
investor landscape stipulates that the institutional groups hold the responsibility to involve in the 
monitoring of directors and reassure the transparency of corporate accounts (Stewardship Code, 
2010). 
The Stewardship Code (Provision E.2.2, 2014) requires companies to justify how the 
engagement with the shareholders takes place, especially in cases that a significant proportion 
of the shareholders were opposed to a resolution. The above provision aims to assess how the 
concerns of institutional investors are being answered by the agents. Further to the above, the 
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Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has made amendments in the above regulatory frameworks 
to assert the quality of financial reporting and attribute a higher level of quality to the relationship 
of shareholders and agents (Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship, 2017).  
Through a Tiering Exercise, there is an elaboration of how institutional investors are cultivating a 
more profound stewardship role (Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship, 
2017). The FRC pointed out the increase of the quality of transparency and the higher 
compliance with the principles of the Code. 
 
Sir Win Bischoff, chairman of the FRC, said: 
 
“Over the past few years, the FRC has taken a series of actions to deal with the outcomes of the 
global economic crisis. In 2014 we amended the UK Corporate Governance Code to improve 
the management and reporting of risk and encourage companies and investors to take a long-
term view. In order to help companies focus on implementing and benefitting from these 
changes, we will not substantially revise the Code for at least the next three years, but rather 
focus on market-led and collaborative initiatives on succession planning and corporate culture.” 
 
Contradictory to the above, it is argued that the aforementioned codes have not resulted in 
incentivizing institutional shareholders to be actively involved in the governance of their investee 
companies (Keasey et al., 2005). The compliance with the Code is criticized as a superficial “box 
– ticking” process (Arcot et al., 2010). The non – compliance explanations are inefficient and 
impede the purposeful compliance with the Code (Arcot et al., 2010). Cheffins (2010) find 
evidence that the incentives for responsible stewardship are weak. It is arguable that the 
shareholders are inadequate monitors, due to lack of incentives alignment and high stewardship 
costs (Arcot et al., 2010). In the Myners Report, it is stated that pension funds are unwilling to 
engage actively with investee companies (Myners, 2001). Tilba et al. (2013) provide evidence 
about the pension funds and argue that the primordial focus is placed to their liquidity rather than 
a conscious involvement in corporate affairs. Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) portray that the 
applicable tax – exempt regime for pensions funds forge their orientation towards dividends 
payouts and their indifference to corporate affairs. 
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Furthermore, Cheffins (2010) reports that foreign investors are the majoritarian player in the UK 
environment, indicating the detachment from the domestic entities. The UK Office for National 
Statistics released information on the UK stock market ownership5 scheme at 31 December 
2014. According to the statistics, UK individuals hold an estimated 12% of listed shares by value 
on London Stock Exchange, while institutional owners (unit trusts, other financial institutions, 
insurance companies, pension funds, investment trusts and banks) own in aggregate a 28%. 
The majority of UK shares are owned by the rest of the world. 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
 
The statistical bulletin indicates that the largest holding group is the “Rest of World” with a 54% 
in which the largest blockholders are institutional owners (approx. 70% in North America and 
34% in the rest countries).  North American investors have increasingly invested directly in the 
ordinary shares of UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. European holdings 
                                                          
5
  The statistical bulletin is based on companies domiciled in the UK. 
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stood at 26%. Investors that reside in Asia held 16% of quoted UK shares (Office for National 
Statistics, 2014). Approximately half (50%) of the UK quoted shares held by investors in North 
America are held in unit trusts, with other financial institutions accounting for around a quarter 
(25%) and pension funds for a fifth (20%) (Statistical bulletin Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, 
2014). 
 
 
 
Adam Palin points out the causality of the aforementioned shift in the UK institutional investors’ 
attitude and their lesser presence as holding group of the UK ordinary shares:  
 
“Following both the 2000 crash and the most recent financial crisis of 2008-9, 
insurers and pension groups were prompted to reduce risk in their portfolio, 
replacing equities with bonds.” (Financial Times, 2015). 
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The Kay Report (2012) presents corroboratory evidence that the pension fund schemes were 
urged to swift towards bonds. 
Although, according to the Investment Association, during 2016 the pension funds in the UK 
remain the major and more influential institutional shareholder, holding a 44% of the UK assets 
(Asset Management Survey 2016-2017, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
All the above bring into sharp focus the investigation of the role of institutional owners in the UK 
investor environment. A key consideration to examine is the orientation of these institutional 
owners. The studies suggest that in Q1 2015 there was a net investment of £13 billion in short-
term assets. This propensity for short investment horizons might illustrate the investment 
landscape. Investors are strategizing to position themselves on short-term investments instead 
to guide their investments to success over the long haul.  
 
Source: The Investment Association Annual Survey 
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Source: Office for National Statistics 
 
The Kay Review highlights the disengagement of institutional investors and their short-termism. 
Below, the chart displays the sharp shortfall in average holding periods for UK equities since the 
mid-60s from a period of almost 8 years to just 7½ months in 2007: 
 
FTSE Average Holding Periods 1966-2005 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
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Neil Woodford, Head of UK equities at Invesco Perpetual, has pointed out that shareholder 
engagement requires a “successful reform that would be achieved only when shareholders 
voted with their voices and not with their feet, by acting like 'owners' not 'traders'”. 
Additional to the above, the Investment Association provides corroboratory evidence that there 
is a swift towards passive investment. The report states that around 66% of assets are actively 
managed in comparison with 83% a decade ago. 
Unbundling the dominance of overseas shareowners, it is observable that the current trend 
results in a further disengagement of the shareholders from the long-term success of the 
investee companies. The holding of immensely diversified portfolios worldwide, the difficulty to 
attend meetings, the impediments of information flow may result in distant and disengaged 
investing culture (Cheffins, 2010). 
The perplexity of the relationships is never-ending due to the fact that many funds are subject to 
fund management. Fund managers are not induced in active monitoring, due to the high 
monitoring costs and their disassociation with the increased profits from an active involvement 
(Keasay et al., 2005). 
 
2.3.2. Testable hypothesis 
 
This study will investigate if the high or low level of institutional ownership in the UK acts actually 
as a filter for lesser or more earnings management. The focus will be placed on discretionary 
accruals and real activities manipulation and if there is a significant negative or positive relation 
with high or lower level of institutional ownership.  
The association between abnormal accruals and the level of institutional ownership may be 
nonlinear (Koh, 2003; Wang, 2014). A low proportion of institutional ownership level is translated 
into feeble influence on managerial discretion and it is disjointed with the abnormal accruals 
(Wang, 2014). Nonetheless, a high proportion of institutional investors with immensely influential 
control rights should display a positive relationship with the attenuation of managerial discretion 
(Koh, 2003; Wang, 2014).  
The assumption of a non-linear relationship between the level of institutional ownership and the 
earnings management is worthwhile to be tested in the UK environment (Wang, 2014) 
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H1: The institutional ownership and income – increasing discretionary accruals are associated 
following a non-linear relation. A concave (inverter – U) relation will be more specifically 
investigated. 
 
H2: The institutional ownership and real activities management are associated following a non-
linear relation. A concave (inverter – U) relation will be more specifically investigated. 
 
3. Research design 
 
3. 1 Data and Sample Selection 
 
This study includes the UK listed non - financial firms during the time period between 2012 and 
2016. The data are collected from the AMADEUS database. Regarding the ownership data, 
information was gathered from the Thomson financial database. The selected firms belong to 
the top 250 by market capitalization, so as to reassure an ample sample with efficient corporate 
information and active governance mechanisms. The sample excludes financial institutions, 
regulated firms and mining companies due to the specific rules applied for their reporting. The 
sample to be tested is 122 companies. 
There will be primarily reliance on the proxies of Koh (2003), but as well the ones developed by 
Roychowdhurry (2003) and used as well by Kim et al. (2011). 
The focus on a single-country provides with a better understanding of the regulatory and the 
legislative environment, while the UK is the ideal setting since it provides a slew of dispersedly – 
owned companies. 
 
3.2 Measuring Institutional Ownership  
 
The above suggests that institutional ownership impacts on discretionary decisions and real 
activities manipulation. To examine the influence of institutional ownership on the earnings 
management, a proxy, hereafter INSTIT, is employed (Koh, 2003). INSTIT is calculated as the 
total shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding (Koh, 2003). 
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Following Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2008), there will be the inclusion of institutional 
shareholders with shareholding above 1%. 
 
3.3 Measuring Earnings Management  
 
Teoh et al. (1998) find that the firms with high earnings management tend to under – deliver in 
the long-term. The above highlights the importance to measure the earnings management with 
proxies.  
Dechow et al. (1995) show that abnormal accruals are used as an empirical indicator of earnings 
management. Many studies have developed proxies to measure the discretionary accruals 
(Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991). One of the most sophisticated tools to measure 
discretionary accruals is the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). Regarding the real 
activities manipulation, Roychowdhurry (2006) develops different models that synthesize the 
proxy for real activities manipulation. 
The selection of accruals-based earnings management and the real activities manipulation 
provides a more holistic view of the most widely-used methods for earnings management. 
 
3.3.1 Measuring Discretionary Accruals 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) employ the modified Jones model, which enhances the detection of 
earnings management. To compare it with the Jones model (1991), the approach followed is the 
deviation from the assumption that total revenues are non-discretionary. In the modified Jones 
model, the total accruals are regressed on gross property, plant, and equipment and the change 
in revenues are adjusted for changes in receivables. Dechow et al. (1995) assume that sales are 
not managed, but that the entire change in accounts receivable represents earnings 
management. The above implicates that the changes in the credit sales derive from earnings 
management (Peasnell et al., 2000; 2005).  The residuals from the modified Jones model are 
considered to be the abnormal accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). Contrary to the above, Francis et 
al., (2005) support that the modified Jones model is not an effective tool to detect abnormal 
accruals since the total accruals are regressed on a narrow set of variables.  
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Prior studies (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998) have developed a cross-sectional model of the 
Jones model (Jones, 1991) to obtain a proxy for discretionary accruals. The model is estimated 
by industry and fiscal year, so as to control for industry-wide changes (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994).All variables (with the exception of the intercept) are scaled by lagged total assets to 
reduce heteroskedasticity (Peasnell et al., 2000).  
Bartov et al. (2001) find that the cross – sectional modified Jones model outperform the time-
series model in the detection of earnings management. In this study, the aforementioned cross – 
sectional model will be applied so as to avoid specification problems, survivorship bias problems 
and wrong assumptions of stationarity regarding the ΔREV and PPE (Peasnell et al., 2000; Koh, 
2003).  
 
The modified Jones model parameters are estimated based on the below cross – sectional OLS 
regression: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
=  α1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + α2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  α3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (1) 
 
TACCi,t =  total accruals of firm i for period t, measured as the difference between net 
income and cash flow from operations. 
TAi,t =  lagged total assets. 
ΔREVi,t = change in revenues. 
ΔRECi,t = change in accounts receivable. 
PPEi,t =  gross property, plant and equipment. 
i,t =  firm and time subscripts. 
εi,t =  residual term. 
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Industries with less than 5 observations have been subtracted from the sample. 
 
Table 1: Selection Criteria 
  
Active 20,139,449 
Main stock exchange: London Stock Exchange 1,478 
Very large & large companies, active with recent detailed financials 1,442 
US SIC (exclusion of financial institutions, mining companies and regulated firms) 887 
Institutional ownership (Banks and Financial companies, Insurance companies, Hedge funds, 
Mutual & Pension Funds/Nominees/Trusts/Trustees, owning together between 5% and 100%) 796 
Annual market capitalization: Top 250, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, for all the selected periods, 
exclusion of companies with no recent or limited financial data 212 
Years with available accounts: 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012 196 
Less: companies with missing data (10) 
Less: companies with US SIC industry code with less than 5 observations (64) 
Total 122 
 
 
3.3.2 Measuring real activities manipulation 
 
Managers manipulate discretionary accruals so as to distort the real financial results. Zang 
(2007) has demonstrated that management uses interchangeably, meaning as substitutes, the 
accrual manipulations and real earnings management.  
Roychowdhury (2006) sheds light on real activities manipulations, which he defines as 
managerial actions that deviate from normal business practices, so as to meet predefined 
earnings thresholds. His findings suggest that firms tend to (1) increase sales providing price 
discounts or less constraining credit terms; (2) increase the production, so as to inflate the 
inventory value and lead to lower cost of goods sold;  (3) manipulate the discretionary expenses, 
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meaning the decrease of R&D, advertising and SG&A expenses, to demonstrate higher 
operating margins. 
Based on the proxies developed by Kim et al. (2011), there will be estimation of the real 
activities manipulation using: 1) abnormal levels of operating cash flows (AB_CFO), 2) abnormal 
production costs (AB_PROD), 3) abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_EXP), and (4) a 
combined measure of real activities manipulation (hereafter COMBINED_RAM). The first three 
proxies are measured as the residual from the corresponding industry – year models. The 
COMBINED_RAM is calculated based on the expected directions of the first three variables: 
AB_CFO - AB_PROD + AB_EXP.  The methodology followed for real activities manipulation is 
outlined in the Appendix. 
The results from the above metrics will show if there is consistency between the institutional 
ownership and the real activities manipulation. If there is consistency, the high (low) level of 
institutional presence will be positively (negatively) interwoven with AB_CFO, AB_EXP, 
COMBINED_RAM and negatively (positively) with AB_PROD. 
 
3.4 Empirical models 
 
We evaluate the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management by 
calculating the following OLS regressions: 
 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
+ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑡
2 +  𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑃𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡  +
𝛼7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼8𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑡
2 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
++ 𝛼4𝑃𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡  +
𝛼7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼8𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
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Where,  
 
DACCR+  : the value of income – increasing discretionary accruals, where discretionary 
accruals are calculated according to the cross-sectional modified Jones 
model. 
COMB_RAM   : ABN_CFO - ABN_PROD + ABN_DISEXP. 
ABN_CFO  : the abnormal operating cash flows. 
ABN_PROD   : the abnormal production costs, where production costs are interpreted as 
the sum of the cost of goods sold and change in inventory. 
ABN_DISEXP  : the abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the 
sum of Advertising, Research and Development, and Selling General and 
Administrative Expenses. 
INSTIT  : the proportion of firm’s stocks owned by institutional investors who possess 
at least 1% of common stock. 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇2   : the square value of institutional ownership. 
PB  : the price – to – book value ratio. 
SIZE : the natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEV : the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
ROA  : the net income to total assets ratio. 
BIG4 : the dummy variable: 1 if the auditor is one of the big 4 companies and 0 
otherwise. 
𝜀𝑡  : the residual term. 
𝛼0 : the constant. 
𝛼1 𝑡𝑜 𝛼7 : the coefficients. 
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3.5 Control Variables 
 
There will be also inclusion of control variables, such as the price – to – book value ratio (PB), to 
capture the growth effect, the size, the leverage of the companies, so as to capture the capital 
structure, the return on assets ratio (ROA) that captures the financial performance, but as well 
the auditing by Big 4 firms that is an indicator of the quality of the financial reports (Koh, 2003; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Kim et al., 2011). 
The above variables are selected due to their complementary role in decomposing the earnings 
manipulation. The price – to – book value ratio introduces the growth effect as a control variable. 
The growth rate captures the earnings management incentives and it is a financial performance 
measure (Kothari et al., 2005; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Kim et al., 2011). Roychowdhurry (2006) 
delineates that the growth opportunities, but as well the size of the firms, are the primordial 
independent variables that interpret earnings management. The growth is captured by the price 
– to – book ratio (PB) and it is associated with large accruals (McNichols, 2002; Larcker et al., 
2007).  
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) delineate that the firm size is associated with accounting 
malfeasance. According to the principal – agent literature, agency problems arise between 
shareholders and managers of large firms where ownership is widely dispersed (Berle and 
Means, 1932). Large firms exert additional pressure on their management to report earnings 
according to the projections (Carlson & Bathala, 1997; Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002). 
Consequently, managers are being pressured to achieve the above demand (Lo, 2008). 
Following a slew of prior studies, the applied proxy SIZE is estimated as a natural logarithm of 
totals assets. 
The leverage of a firm is an indicator of how well the company fulfils its debt and contractual 
obligations. Close to default on debt covenants, there is a higher possibility for maltreatment of 
financial results (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 1990; Sweeney, 1994). The proxy for leverage, 
hereafter LEV, is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (Cotter, 1998; Ramsay 
and Sidhu, 1998).  
There will be the inclusion of ROA as well, which captures the firm performance and how 
efficiently a firm manages its assets so as to deliver profitability (Kothari et al., 2005; Kim et al., 
2011). 
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[28] 
 
The large auditing firms are perceived to bring a breadth of quality into the financial statements 
(Becker et al., 1998). Regarding the inclusion of the audit firm size as a proxy for audit quality, 
there are several studies that use a dummy variable for Big Four/non-Big Four membership 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al., 1998, DeFond 1992; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). BIG4 will 
be the proxy for the audit quality, so as to estimate if the dominance of reputable auditing firms 
contributes to financial reporting integrity. DeAngelo (1981) argues that large auditing firms 
provide more transparency and credibility over the financial statements due to their 
independence. Following Becker et al. (1998), auditor quality is anticipated to have a negative 
association with discretionary accruals. Big auditing firms scrutinize their clients so as to 
reassure the absence of stains on their reputation. The fear of reputation loss is a driving force 
for the emphasis placed on the financial statements trustworthiness.  
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4. Results 
 
Proceeding with the regression, the observations are narrowed in 318 because I have chosen to 
examine the income - increasing discretionary accruals. In case that the study was entrenched 
in unsigned discretionary accruals there will reduction in the power of the tests (Wang, 2014). 
The dispersion over the years and the different industries follows: 
 
 
Table 2 presents the summary of the descriptive statistics. The mean for the income – 
increasing discretionary accruals is approximately 4% and its median is 2%. The institutional 
ownership is determined with the proxy INSTIT. The institutional investors hold, on average, 
approximately 25% of total shares outstanding of the sample firms. The above finding concerns 
the top ten holders who exert the more influential role. The above result is consistent with 
Farinha (2003) in which he identifies that the mean for the institutional ownership in British firms 
is approximately 24%. The variable COMB_RAM reflects the real activities manipulation and its 
mean is – 6%. The negative sign is consistent with the perception that discretionary accruals 
and real activities manipulation act as surrogates (Wang, 2014). Additionally, the PB ratio 
indicates that more than the half sample firms are considered to be attractive investment 
choices. Regarding the profitability of the sample firms, the findings suggest that the assets are 
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being efficiently invested and yield profits. The results suggest that the leverage, LEV, is quite 
low with a mean of 18.16%. It is worthwhile to mention that the 75% of the sample firms have a 
leverage ratio of less than 29%. Farinha and Foronda (2009) find evidence that in Common Law 
countries the leverage has a median less than 30%. An 8.4% mean for the ROA delineates the 
profitability of the firms, which is consistent with the 7% of Farinha and Foronda (2009). 
Concerning the audit quality, the results demonstrate that the majority of the sample firms are 
being audited by a big 4 auditor (mean 97.17%). 
     
Table 2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
        
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max p25 Median p75 
        DACC
+
 0.03627 0.04062 0.00001 0.19378 0.00495 0.02093 0.05322 
INSTIT 0.24817 0.15600 0.05000 0.90720 0.14270 0.21310 0.31180 
INSTIT
2
 0.08585 0.12124 0.00250 0.82301 0.02036 0.04541 0.09722 
COMB_RAM -0.06207 0.40661 -2.28361 1.06446 -0.28458 -0.01093 0.16479 
Control variables 
      SIZE 7.49743 1.47007 4.44265 10.90614 6.41346 7.45408 8.41936 
PB 3.54192 4.43959 -14.68000 31.87000 1.42000 2.54500 4.29000 
LEV 0.18159 0.15603 0.00000 0.64687 0.04242 0.15845 0.28811 
ROA 0.08428 0.06213 -0.07000 0.29000 0.04000 0.07000 0.12000 
Dummy variable 
      BIG4 0.97170 0.16610 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
 
DACC
+
, discretionary accruals; COMB_RAM, real activities manipulation; INSTIT, percentage of 
institutional ownership; INSTIT
2
, square of percentage institutional ownership (INSTIT); PB, price – to – 
book value ratio; SIZE, natural logarithm of total assets; LEV, ratio of long-term debt to total liabilities; 
ROA, return on assets; BIG4, auditor dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors, 0 otherwise), 
number of observations: 318; years: 2012 – 2016. 
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The Spearman correlation matrix follows and defines the correlations among the income-
increasing discretionary accruals, real activities manipulation, the institutional ownership and the 
rest control variables. The results are displayed in Table 3. 
 
 Income – increasing discretionary accruals are positively associated with ROA, consistent with 
the results in Jiang & Anandarajan (2009) and negatively associated with PB, LEV and SIZE. 
The findings coincide with the results of Kim et al. (2011). Watts and Zimmerman’s (1990), Mitra 
and Cready (2005) have claimed that due to political costs large firms display greater vigilance 
regarding the discretionary accruals so as to confront the analysts and the shareholders. The 
low leverage (18%) in alignment with the negative association with the discretionary accruals 
finds further support in DeAngelo et al. (1994). Their study provides evidence that firms are 
anchored in low leverage to avoid violation of debt covenants.  
The institutional ownership is negatively associated with SIZE and ROA. Besides, it is negatively 
associated with the LEV variable, which is consistent with Carlson and Bathala (1997), Koh 
(2003), Hsu and Koh (2005). The COMB_RAM variable as an explanatory variable is positively 
correlated with PB and ROA. Roychowdhurry (2006) points out that firms with high growth are 
more pressured to meet earnings targets, thus they tend to employ earnings management 
practices. Regarding the positive correlation with ROA, the finding is consistent with Kim et al. 
(2011). SIZE proxy is negatively associated with the PB ratio, suggesting that large firms may 
have a smaller growth. The aforementioned variable is positively associated with the leverage, 
which is consistent with the bibliography that larger firms have less restrictive covenants for 
leverage (Cotter, 1998; Koh, 2003; Hsu & Koh, 2005; Kim et al., 2011). The PB ratio is positively 
associated with ROA, which coincides with the findings of Kim et al. (2011). 
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Table 3: Spearman correlation matrix among positive DACC, real activities manipulation, institutional 
ownership and other control variables 
          
 
DACC
+
 INSTIT INSTIT
2
 COMB_RAM SIZE PB LEV ROA BIG4 
          DACC
+
 1.0000 
        p-value ‒ 
        INSTIT -0.1067 1.0000 
       p-value 0.0573 ‒ 
       INSTIT
2
 -0.1067 1.0000 1.0000 
      p-value 0.0573 0.0000 ‒ 
      COMB_RAM -0.0226 -0.0229 -0.0229 1.0000 
     p-value 0.6881 0.6841 0.6841 ‒ 
     SIZE -0.1373 -0.2419 -0.2419 0.0664 1.0000 
    p-value 0.0143 0.0000 0.0000 0.2376 ‒ 
    PB -0.1097 0.0256 0.0256 0.1415 -0.2663 1.0000 
   p-value 0.0507 0.6495 0.6495 0.0115 0.0000 ‒ 
   LEV -0.0550 -0.1597 -0.1597 0.0781 0.5783 -0.0676 1.0000 
  p-value 0.3281 0.0043 0.0043 0.1648 0.0000 0.2292 ‒ 
  ROA 0.3133 -0.1153 -0.1153 0.2254 -0.2529 0.2526 -0.2859 1.0000 
 p-value 0.0000 0.0400 0.0400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ‒ 
 BIG4 -0.0561 0.2454 0.2454 0.0478 0.0310 0.0241 0.0399 -0.0900 1.0000 
p-value 0.3188 0.0000 0.0000 0.3954 0.5820 0.6690 0.4787 0.1091 ‒ 
 
All p – values are two – tailed. DACC
+
, income – increasing discretionary accruals; INSTIT, percentage of 
institutional ownership;INSTIT
2
, square of percentage institutional ownership (INSTIT); COMB_RAM, real 
activities manipulation (ABNCFO-ABNPROD+ABNDISEXP); PB, price – to – book value ratio; SIZE, 
natural logarithm of total assets; LEV, ratio of long-term debt to total liabilities; ROA, return on assets; 
BIG4, auditor dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors, 0 otherwise). 
 
 
4.1 Regression analysis 
 
The results have spawned considerable interest due to the fact that the variables INSTIT and 
INSTIT2 have negative and positive sign respectively. Both coefficients of the above variables 
are statistically significant. Their signs (negative for INSTIT and positive for INSTIT2) imply that 
the relation is quadratic. 
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results - Discretionary accruals 
     
Variable   Coefficient   
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
     INSTIT 
 
-0.081673 
 
-2.04000 
  
 
 
(0.04200)** 
INSTIT
2
 
 
0.1672832 
 
3.29000 
    
(0.00100)*** 
DACC 
 
-0.0118559 
 
-2.18000 
    
(0.03000)** 
SIZE 
 
-0.0017944 
 
-1.00000 
    
(0.31900) 
PB 
 
-0.0012948 
 
-2.58000 
    
(0.01000)*** 
LEV 
 
0.044722 
 
2.73000 
    
(0.00700)*** 
ROA 
 
0.2413691 
 
6.45000 
    
(0.00000)*** 
BIG4 
 
0.0004521 
 
0.04000 
    
(0.97200) 
_CONS 
 
0.0305828 
 
1.49000 
      (0.13800) 
Adjusted R
2
       0.15040 
 
DACC
+
, discretionary accruals; COMB_RAM, real activities manipulation; INSTIT, percentage of 
institutional ownership; INSTIT
2
, square of percentage institutional ownership (INSTIT); PB, price – to – 
book value ratio; SIZE, natural logarithm of total assets; LEV, ratio of long-termdebt to total liabilities; 
ROA, return on assets; BIG4, auditor dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors, 0 otherwise), 
number of observations: 318; years: 2012 – 2016. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, having applied a two – 
tailed test 
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The institutional variable is statistically significant at 5% and it is negatively associated with the 
discretionary accruals. Consequently, the above signs explain that the income – increasing 
discretionary accruals in association with INSTIT and INSTIT2 follow a non – linear relation. The 
above finding implies that a higher concentration of ownership puts impetus to income-
increasing discretionary accruals. Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga & Foronda (2012) found that 
higher stakes of institutional investors (captured as INSTIT2) imply a higher concentration of 
power and control, which may be detrimental for the benefits of the rest shareholders. 
Simultaneously, a smaller percentage of institutional investors are a catalyst in constraining 
earnings management.  Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga & Foronda, (2012) find evidence that a 
lower institutional involvement is an effective mechanism for corporate governance. 
 
Following the studies of Utama and Cready (1997), Koh (2003), Farinha and Foronda (2009) 
there will be the calculation of the “turning point”. The “turning point” in this case will be the 
minimization point between the discretionary accruals and the institutional ownership: 
 
Minimization point = -b2/(2*b3) = - (-.081673)/(2*.1672832) = 24.41% 
 
 
A non-linear relation between institutional ownership and income-increasing discretionary 
accruals is identified where the institutional ownership exerts a quadratic influence to 
discretionary accruals. The above result might be an extension of the quadratic relation between 
the active institutional owners and the firm value (Navissi and Naiker, 2006). Navissi and Naiker 
(2006) find evidence in New Zealand, a common law country, that the impact of active 
institutional investors above the threshold of 30% shareholding might be detrimental for the firm 
value. Earnings smoothing could distort the market’s assessment of the corporate value and its 
access to fundraising from the external capital markets (Burns et al., 2006). 
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A further analysis should be performed to understand the dynamics of this relation. The findings 
suggest that below the threshold of 24.41% there will be a curtailment of earnings management 
and consequently a higher transparency of the financial reports. Above the turning point there 
will be upwards earnings management as long as the institutional ownership increases. Based 
on prior studies, the possible reasons behind the above result might be: 1) the institutional 
investors may be aligned with the management and its preference for self – serving behaviour 
and 2) the institutional investors at high level of shareholding act as insiders. McColgan (2001) 
finds that as the shareholding increases, the propensity for self – serving behaviour is higher.  
When there are close business ties between the managers and the shareholders, managers 
forge the institutional blockholders to vote in alignment with their recommendations (Cvijanović, 
Dasgupta & Zachariadis, 2016). This might render the institutional investors more pressure 
sensitive (Brickley et al., 1988) so as to consent to management decisions.  Long-term 
institutional investors may favour the entrenched management as their relationship may evolve 
into a mutually beneficial one (Pound, 1988). Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga & Foronda (2012) 
purport that institutional owners such as banks or insurance companies due to their expertise 
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and their involvement in the corporate performance and in the investment decisions urge the 
formation of “controlling coalitions” with the managers that galvanize firm misconduct. Zhong, 
Gribbin and Zheng (2007) find evidence that outside blockholders might be induced in higher 
returns and exert pressure to the management resulting in accruals manipulation. 
Wang (2014) states that a high level of institutional ownership could be associated with the 
tendency of institutional investors to pursue their own interests and be less engaged in 
monitoring. Claessens et al. (2002) provide evidence that ownership concentration by 
blockholders exert negative impact on the residual of minority shareholders. Jiang & 
Anandarajan (2009) suggest that high levels of transient investors have a negative impact on the 
protection of shareholders rights and the management curtailment. Leuz et al. (2003) contend 
that controlling shareholders may follow their private benefits and be enticed to earnings 
smoothing at the expense of the non – controlling shareholders. Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga & 
Foronda (2012) demonstrate that low institutional ownership in common law countries gears up 
the corporate performance, while when it is high, there is a possibility of performance 
deterioration. The above finding is consistent with the relation between firm quality decrease and 
the institutional ownership (Jennings, 2005). 
A higher concentration of institutional ownership, above 25%, might be regarded as transforming 
institutional investors to insiders. Though the existence of pure insiders in Common Law 
countries is considered to be low (Farinha and Foronda, 2009; Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga & 
Foronda, 2012). Bushee (2004) classifies investors as transient, quasi – indexers and dedicated 
investors. He states that dedicated investors, who are considered to be farsighted, are not 
sensitive to the high level of disclosure. The above finding is attributable to their high ownership 
stake which delegates them an insider role. Actually, Farinha and Foronda (2009) measure 
insider ownership as the percentage of managerial ownership, but as well the ownership with all 
the shareholders with a holding above 5% of total shares. Consequently, Farinha and Foronda 
(2009) claim that in Common Law countries institutional and insider ownership is interlinked. 
Bushee and Goodman (2007) show that institutional investors are better informed than individual 
investors, a role mostly attributable to insiders. Fan and Wong (2002) demonstrate that 
concentrated ownership is linked with private benefits with respect to the insider knowledge. The 
UK, belonging to common law countries, has potent mechanisms to protect investors (LaPorta et 
al., 1998), nevertheless in case that the high ownership of stakes by institutional investors is 
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translated as insider ownership, this might be associated with earnings management. Insiders 
are positively associated with more opaque financial statements (Gopalan & Jayaraman, 2012). 
Leuz et al. (2003) find corroboratory evidence that insiders are more inclined to misspecification 
of the reported earnings. Viewed in this light, as insider ownership increases, insiders (managers 
and investors with over a 5% stake in a firm) tend to pursue their own interests and they consent 
to increased dividend payouts so as to shadow their prolific profile (Farinha & Foronda, 2009). 
The turning point at the 24.41% is in accordance with the study of Farinha (2003) who finds a 
turning point in the U-shape relation between the insider ownership and the dividend payouts at 
the 30% level. Complimentary to the above, Matsumoto (2002) finds a positive association 
between higher institutional ownership and earnings management. Earnings management 
practices are followed so as to influence earnings forecasts and eliminate negative earnings 
surprises (Matsumoto, 2002). 
 
It follows the presentation of the OLS results for the real activities manipulation. Table 5 reports 
the results of the regression. The findings show that the institutional ownership is not associated 
with the real activities manipulation.  
Zang (2007), Cohen et al. (2008) Kim et al. (2011) point out that discretionary accruals and real 
activities manipulation act as surrogates. The below findings show a negative association 
between income- increasing discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. In the case 
of the UK landscape, the institutional investors are associated with the income - increasing 
discretionary accruals but there is no evidence for such an association with the real activities 
manipulation. Consequently, institutional investors are not involved with managerial discretion 
regarding the operations of the firm.  This might be attributable to the fact that the engagement 
in real activities manipulation, even if it is a less detectable falsification (Kothari et al., 2005), is a 
costly procedure and detrimental for firm’s value which stems from its future cash flows 
(Roychowdhurry, 2006; Zhao et al., 2012). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) associate real earnings 
management with the poor investment decision- making which could pose in danger the 
corporate performance. Gunny (2005) contends that real earnings management hinders the 
long-term operating performance of a firm. It should be highlighted that the above findings are 
framed within this specific sample of firm. 
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It is noticeable that the discretionary accruals are statistically significant and negatively 
associated with REM, which coincides with the wider literature (Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 
2007; Cohen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011). More specifically, the negative relation stems from 
the strong association with the abnormal CFO. Besides, COMB_RAM is associated positively 
with leverage and ROA. The above results demonstrate that firms with higher leverage and more 
profitability are more likely to be engaged in earning management through real activities 
manipulation.  
At this point, the attention should be drawn on the abnormal cash flow from operations 
(ABN_CFO) due to the high explanatory power of the model (41%). There is a positive 
association between ABN_CFO with the SIZE and ROA, meaning that larger and more profitable 
firms are more engaged in distortion of the real operations. Consistent with the literature, REM 
have a negative association with the BIG4 auditing firms. 
Regarding ABN_PROD, the findings suggest a negative relation with SIZE, PB and ROA. 
Consequently, large and profitable firms, with high growth opportunities, do not implement 
manipulation regarding the production costs which could jeopardize the firm’s long-term viability. 
Concerning ABN_EXP, there is a positive association with the leverage, meaning that higher 
leverage might invoke the increase of the abnormal expenses. There is as well a positive 
association with ROA and BIG4, which suggests that more profitable firms exert manipulation of 
the expenses. 
 
  
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[39] 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression Results - Real Activities Manipulation 
     
    
  ABN_CFO  ABN_PROD  ABN_EXP  COMB_RAM 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
     
    
DACC
+
 
 
-0.71943 0.0804  0.53404  -1.13635 
  
(-11.27000)***  0.1700  1.24000  (-1.93000)* 
INSTIT 
 
-0.11451  -0.2315  -0.41754  0.33915 
  
-1.44000  -0.4700  -0.92000  0.46000 
INSTIT
2
 
 
0.13119  0.0369  -0.37999  -0.05483 
  
1.57000  0.1000  -1.10000  -0.07000 
SIZE 
 
0.00579  -0.0280  -0.00621  0.02763 
  
(2.86000)***  (-2.3300)**  -0.57000  1.48000 
PB 
 
0.00084  -0.0086  -0.00271  0.00675 
  
1.46000  (-2.5200)**  -0.87000  1.27000 
LEV 
 
-0.00913  -0.0898  0.33061  0.41126 
  
-0.49000  -0.8100  (3.27000)***  (2.39000)*** 
ROA 
 
0.45412  -0.6479  0.60230  1.70433 
  
(10.43000)***  (-2.5000)**  (2.55000)**  (4.24000)*** 
BIG4 
 
-0.02988  -0.0168  0.15423  0.14112 
  
(-1.97000)**  -0.1900  (1.88000)**  1.01000 
_CONS 
 
-0.02385  0.3520  -0.35622  -0.73207 
   -0.91000  2.2500  -2.50000  -3.02000 
Adjusted R
2
   0.41320  0.06050  0.04210  0.06840 
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DACC, discretionary accruals; COMB_RAM, real activities manipulation; INSTIT, percentage of 
institutional ownership; INSTIT
2
, square of percentage institutional ownership (INSTIT); PB, price – to – 
book value ratio; SIZE, natural logarithm of total assets; LEV, ratio of long-term debt to total liabilities; 
ROA, return on assets; BIG4, auditor dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors, 0 otherwise), 
number of observations: 318; years: 2012 – 2016. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, having applied a two – 
tailed test 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
A further sensitivity analysis has been performed to delve into the robustness of the above 
findings. For this reason, a second regression was run which incorporates the institutional 
ownership with a holding of above the 5% threshold, following Wang (2014). According to the 
results, there is no significant difference with the aforementioned findings and signs for the lower 
and higher institutional ownership. A decrease in the explanatory power of the model is 
observable. Jiang and Anandarajan (2009) found that the decrease of the percentage of 
institutional ownership impacts on the explanatory power of the model. 
An additional regression analysis was run taking into consideration the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. The sample observations rise to 610. The signs regarding the institutional 
ownership remain the same as well, with no significant difference. In order to perform a further 
analysis, a performance-matched model, as developed in Kothari et al. (2005), was applied and 
the regression analysis provided similar results. The variables INSTIT and INSTIT2 were 
statistically significant at a 1% level and their signs were negative and positive respectively. 
Likewise, the calculation of the real activities manipulation, taking into account an institutional 
ownership of  above 5% and income-increasing discretionary accruals, showed no association 
with the institutional ownership. It is interesting that above the 5% holding, institutional 
ownership and negative- increasing discretionary accruals render the INSTIT variable significant 
at a 10% level, while the INSTIT2 is marginally non – significant at an 11.20% level. The signs 
are negative and positive respectively implying a quadratic relation with real activities 
manipulation. 
 
MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and Financial Management 
 
  
[41] 
 
The performance -matched model for real activities manipulation displayed similar results with 
the cross-sectional modified Jones model. There is no association between real activities 
manipulation and institutional ownership. The above findings remain unchangeable even if there 
is estimation of the model with a holding of the 5% institutional ownership.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Τhe countervailing views regarding the role of the institutional investors highlight the distance 
from a point of convergence. It is conceivable that a problem with high possible nonlinearities 
and interactions among the independent variables leads to the aforementioned results. The 
findings of this study highlight the positive association between the institutional ownership and 
the earnings management. More specifically, the institutional ownership above the 24% level 
tends to adhere to income – increasing discretionary practices. The self-serving behaviour and 
the alignment with managerial interest-based behaviour are identified as the potential causes. 
Regarding the association between the institutional ownership and the real activities 
manipulation, the results suggest the existence of no relation. The inclusion of more variables 
would provide more evidence about the levers for real activities manipulation (Graham et al., 
2005; Zang, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008). 
The findings of this study can be an impetus for further research, which is going to include 
further variables to capture the multi-dimensionality of institutional ownership and the earnings 
management employing a wider sample of firms. Chen and Reitenga (2009) assert that the 
relation between institutional ownership and earnings management is efficiently captured only if 
there is an inclusion of the characteristics of the institutional investors. Actually, as mentioned in 
Leuz et al. (2003), institutional ownership is a difficult variable to be decomposed due to the 
existing endogenous relations.  According to Wang (2014) and Jiang & Anandarajan (2009), the 
institutional ownership can be stipulated in a threefold way: 1) the percentage of holding, 2) the 
investment horizon and 3) the strategy implementation. Jiang and Anandarajan (2009) point out 
the difficulty to distinguish the transient and not – transient investors on a percentage basis. 
Besides, the model itself entails amendments, as mentioned in Kothari et al. (2005).  
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Nevertheless, the role of the institutional investors is an obvious catalyst for the financial 
performance and the longevity of a public firm. Overall, the extant literature on earnings 
management suggests that institutional ownership influences the financial reporting integrity.  
The existence of articulate corporate governance rules proves that the wheels for a better 
stewardship scheme are already in motion (Developments in Corporate Governance and 
Stewardship, 2017). Though, the substantiality of their role is defied, if there is not the 
appropriate enforcement of the existing rules (Cheffins, 2010). It is pivotal to scrutinize the 
enforcement of the rules, so as to reassure that reforms start to bear fruits.  The different 
interests and divergent investment thinking of institutional shareholders dictate their investing 
behaviour (Bushee, 2001). Not all of them are on the same page; at the one end there are the 
ones with more incentives to be active, whilst at the other end, there are the shadowy figures 
(Bushee, 2001). Initiatives from various organizations, such as the Investment Association, have 
been organized so as to help investors to make more – informed investment decisions and 
encourage their involvement and accountability.  
Identifying further areas of improvement, there should be reassurance that all the interfering 
parts, i.e. money managers and corporate managers act in the best interest of the shareholders 
(Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship, 2016). Institutional owners should 
act as effective stewards that guarantee the informativeness of the earnings and increase the 
confidence in financial reporting. Institutional investors should close gaps in a systemic way and 
treat their stewardship role not as a sideshow but as an integral of their investing behaviour 
(Correia, 2010). 
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APPENDIX 
 
MEASUREMENT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PROXIES 
 
 
Real Activities Manipulation 
 
Further to the studies of   Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), it is anticipated that 
operating cash flows are decreased due to sales manipulations.  To estimate the operating cash 
flows, the model developed in Roychowdhury’s study (2006) will be employed: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 
  
 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 = cash flow from operations in year t 
TA  = total assets 
S = net sales 
ΔS = St – St−1 
 
For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations (AB_CFO) is the residual (i.e.  εt) from 
the relevant industry-year model and the firm-year’s sales and lagged assets. 
 
Another measure of real activities manipulation is abnormal production costs. Prior studies 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2011) define production costs as the sum of 
COGS and change in inventory during the year, and they express expenses as a linear function 
of contemporaneous sales: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛽 (
𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝜀𝑡 
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𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡 = The cost of goods sold in year t 
 
The model for inventory normal growth: 
 
𝛥𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛽1 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝜀𝑡 
 
ΔINVt = the change in inventory in year t 
 
Prior studies (Roychowdhury , 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Badertscher , 2011 and Zang, 2011) 
provide the roadmap for the definition of the production costs (PROD = COGS + ΔINV): 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 
 
The third component of real activities manipulation is the abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), and Zang (2011), the estimate of the 
normal level of discretionary expenses is calculated by using the following equation: 
 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛽 (
𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝜀𝑡 
 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 = the discretionary expenses in year t, defined as the sum of R&D, Advertising, and 
SG&A expenses. 
 
For every firm-year, abnormal discretionary expenditure (AB_EXP) is the residual from the 
model. 
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Following Cohen et al. (2008), there will be the construction of a combined measure of real 
activities manipulation. By aggregating the three individual real activities manipulation proxies, 
AB_CFO, AB_PROD, and AB_EXP. Considering the direction of each real activities 
manipulation components, the combined measure, COMBINED_RAM, is calculated as AB_CFO 
- AB_PROD + AB_EXP. 
